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The Question of Apriorism 
by Barry Smith 
I t is often said that Austrian economics embraces what might most properly be ca lled an Aristote-
lian methodology. Thus Austrian economists typically 
adopt a realist perspective, holding that the world 
exists independently of our thinking and reasoning 
activities. They hold further that the world contains 
certain simple essences or natures which may come 
together in law-Hke ways to form more complex static 
and dynamic wholes. Moreover, they hold that tbe 
given essences and essentiaJ structures are intelligi-
ble, in the sense that they are capable of being non-
inductively grasped by the scientific theorist, much 
as we enjoy a capacity to distinguish reds from 
greens, circles from squares, warnings from congrat-
ulations, and so on. 
The science of economics is for the Austrian Aris-
totelian, in no smaJI part, a matter of establishing the 
laws governing the combination or composition of the 
given simple essences or natures in the field of eco-
nomics. Such combination is not merely a matter of 
heaping or gluing together. It is, for example, a mat-
ter of certain entities or properties of entities arising 
in renection of the existence in appropriate combina-
tions of other sorts of entities. Thus, for example, a 
good exists as such, according to Menger, only if the 
following prerequisites are si multaneously pres-
ent: 
1. A need on the part of some human being. 
2. Properties of the object in question which 
render it capable of being brought into a causal 
connection with the satisfaction of this need. 
3. Knowledge of this causal connection on the 
part of the person involved. 
4. Command of the thing sufficient to direct it 
to the satis faction of the need. 1 
If a good exists, then as a matter of de re necessity, 
entities of these other sorts exist also. Such structures 
of de re necessitation are, I want to claim, at the core 
not only ofMenger's work but also of the entire tradition 
of Austrian economics. 
T.he tenets of Aristotelianism referred to above 
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are first and foremost tenets of ontology: they tell us 
what the world is like and how its various parts and 
moments are related to each other. The question of 
apriorism, on the other hand, is skew to all such 
onto logical concerns. It relates exclusively to the sort 
of account one gives of the conditions under which 
knowledge is acquired. 
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All defenders of apriorism share the assumption 
that we are capable of acquiring knowledge of a special 
sort, called "a priori knowledge" via non-inductive 
means. They differ, however, in their accounts of where 
such knowledge comes from. Two broad families of 
apriorist views can be distinguished in this regard. 
On the one hand are what might be called im-
positionist views, which hold that a priori knowledge 
is possible as a result of the fact that the content of 
such knowledge reflects merely certain forms or 
structures that have been imposed or inscribed upon 
the world by the knowing subject. Knowledge, on such 
views, is never directly of reality itself; rather, it 
reflects the "logical structures of the mind," and pen-
etrates to reality only as formed, shaped or modeJJed 
by a mind or theory. 
On the other hand are reflectionist views, which 
hold that we can have a priori knowledge of what 
exists, independently of al l impositions or inscrip-
tions of the mind, as a result of the fact that certain 
strnctures in the world enjoy some degree of intelli-
gibi li ty in their own right. The knowing subject and 
the objects of knowledge are for the reflectionist in 
some sense and to some degree pre-tuned to each 
other. And directly a priori knowledge of reality itself 
is therefore possible, at least at some level of gener-
ality, much along the lines in which we recognize the 
validity of a proof in logic or geometry. 
The impositionist view, of course, finds its classi-
ca 1 expression in the work of Kant, and I would argue 
t.hat great methodological confusion in the ranks of 
Austrian economics has arisen as a result of the 
pervasive assumption that all talk of the a priori 
must of necessity imply an impositionist or Kantian 
framework. For the apriorism lying in the back-
ground of Menge(s think ing is quite clearly 
reflectionist. Menger believes that there are a priori 
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categories ("essences" or "natures") in reality and 
that a priori propositions refJect structures or connec-
tions among such essences existing autonomously in 
the sense that they are not the result of any shaping 
or forming of reality on the part of the experiencing 
subject. The impositionist, in contrast, insists that a 
priori categories must be creatures of the mind, that 
they must be the result of some "imposition of form" 
upon the world. The imposition ist may therefore hold 
that the issue as to which sorts of econonilc structures 
Austrian economics embraces what 
might be called an Aristotelian 
methodologi;. 
exist is a matter for more or less arbitrary legislation 
by the economic theorist, or a matter of the "concep-
tual spectacles" of the economic agent. No grain of 
this idea is to be found in Menger. 
My claim, now, is that the Austrian economist of 
whatever hue works against the background of an 
assumption to the effect that the universals of eco-
nomic reality are not created or imposed in any sense, 
but are discovered through our theoretical efforts. 
Economists do not study concepts or otber creatures 
of the mind. Rather, they study the qualitative na-
tures of and the relations between such categories as 
value, rent, profit, the division of labor, money, etc. 
As Menger puts it in a well-known passage: 
Theoretical economics has the lask of investigat-
ing the general essence and the general connection 
of economic phenomena, not of analyzing economic 
concepts and of drawing Lbe conclusions resulting 
from this analysis. The phenomena , or certain 
aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the 
concepts, are the object of theoretical research j n 
the field of economy. (1883, p . 64n; Eng. p. 37n) 
There is, however, one reason why an imposition-
ist or Kantian reading of the propositions of Austrian 
economics has seemed so tempting to so many. This 
turns on the fact that Menger lays stress both on the 
subjectivism and on the methodological individual-
ism of economics. Indeed, the status of economics as 
a theoretical science can be said to rest, in his eyes, 
on the acceptance of the two theses of subjectivism 
and methodological individualism. For subjectivism 
implies that an economy is not an autonomous forma-
tion with unintelligible properties of its own. Rather 
one can understand the workings of an economy by 
coming to an understanding of how the value of goods 
at earlier stages in the process of production is de-
rived from the value to actual consumers of the prod-
ucts of the later stages. Moreover, one can see why 
this same understanding must apply ceteris paribus 
to every economy in whatever time or place. And 
methodological individualism implies that the whole 
of economics can in principle admit of an understand-
ing of thi s sort, that there are no economic structures 
that cannot be grasped at least in principle in the 
thought experiments of the economist. 
None of the above, however, implies that the 
economist's understanding might flow from the fact 
that the propositions of economics reflect structures 
that have been imposed upon the world- in Kantian 
fashion-by either the economic theorist or the eco-
nomic agent. That is, the intelligibility of basic eco-
nomic structures does not imply ontological 
dependence of such structures on the mind, along the 
lines suggested by the impositionist. Rather, 
Menger's view implies precisely that economic reality 
is such as to manifest intelligible structures in and of 
itself. It is because economic reality is built up in 
intelligible ways out of structures involving human 
thought and action that we are able, by appropriate 
efforts, to read off these structures in and of them-
selves. 
II 
We know now that there is an Aristotelian alter-
native to the Kantian form of apriorism. Mises, how-
ever, seems to see his methodology primarily in terms 
reflecting Kantian doctrines . Indeed the Aristotelian 
alternative seems not to have been explicitly recog-
nized as such by Mises at all, though this is hardly 
surprising, given that the special nature of Austrian 
Aristotelian apriorism was appreciated by very few 
at the time when Mises was working out the philo-
sophical foundations of his praxeology.2 
Common to all aprioristic doctrines, as we said, is 
a view to the effect that there are laws or propositions 
which are intelligible (capable of being grasped by 
non-inductive means). Kantian impositionism is the 
view that such a priori laws or propositions reflect 
categorical impositions of the mind. As a result of the 
influence of the logical positivism of the Vienna circle, 
now, recent Kantian varieties of apriorism have 
tended to take the extreme form which sees such 
categorical impositions as effected always via logic or 
language. More specifically, a priori propositions are 
seen as being characterized by the fact that they can 
in every case be exposed-via a process of stripping 
out defined terms and replacing them with definiens 
consisting of more primitive expressions-as mere 
tautologies or analytic truths, entirely empty of con-
tent. "All bachelors are unmarried" is revealed as 
analytic in this way by being converted into a truth 
to the effect that "All unmarried men are unmarried," 
which is an instance of the logical law "All A's which 
are Bare B." 
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Mises qua methodologist was very clearly 
tempted by the idea that the laws of praxeology 
shou ld be analytic in this sense. The theoretical part 
of economics would then be a purely formal or ana-
lytic discipline whose prindples would flow from the 
logical analysis of certain concepts. Thus praxeology, 
we are told, is like logic and mathematics in the sense 
that its content is a matter of empty tautologies: 
"Aprioristic reasoning is purely conceptual and de-
ductive. It cannot produce anything else but tautolo-
gies and analytic judgments." Thus for example: "In 
the concept of money all the theorems of monetary 
theory are already impHed" (Mises 1966, p. 38). Thus 
while impositionism is not explicitly defended by 
Mises qua methodologist, he does insist on the ana-
lytic character of a priori propositions. The method-
ology which results is thereby rendered inconsistent 
with a reflectionist apriorism, since it implies that 
such propositions are empty of content, and clearly 
propositions that are empty of content are unable to 
picture anything (intelligible) on the side of the ob-
jects of the corresponding theory. 
Economics as a theoretical science 
rests on two theses: subjectivism 
and methodological individualism. 
• 
If we wish to hold on to the view that all the 
propositions of praxeology are analytic _in this sense, 
however, then we shall have to insist that the whole 
of praxeol ogy can be erected on the basis of premises 
involving at most one single primitive non-logical 
concept. For suppose that there were two such con-
cepts, neither definable in terms of the other. Con-
sider, now, the propositions expressing the non-trivial 
relations between these concepts. These cannot, ex 
hypothesi, be analytic, for there are now no defined 
non-logical terms which could be eliminated in such 
a way as to reveal the corresponding statements as 
truths oflogic, and no truth oflogic contains a plural-
ity of non-logical terms in other than trivial ways. But 
nor, from the Misesian point of view, can they be 
merely factual (synthetic a posteriori). On the posi-
tivist reading of the Kantian aprioristic doctrine, 
however, no third alternative is available, which im-
plies that the original assumption that there are two 
(or more) such concepts must be rejected.3 This helps 
to make intelligible the repeated insistence of Mises 
and his followers and critics that there is but one 
single non-logical concept (or "category" or "essence") 
of the praxeological discipline, the concept human 
action: 
The scope of praxeology is t he explication of t.he 
category of human action. All t.hat is needed for the 
deduct.ion of all praxeological theorems is knowl-
edge of lhe essence of human action ... The only 
way to a cognition of these theorem s is logical 
analysis of our inherent. knowledge of the category 
of actio n .... Like logic and mathematics, praxeo-
logical knowledge is in us; it does not come from 
wit.hout.. (Mises 1966, p. 64) 
III 
When once we exami ne Mises's practice, however, 
then a quite different picture is presented. For we are 
forced to recognize that there is a veritable plenitude of 
non-logical primitive concepts at the root of praxeology. 
Indeed, Mises's descriptions of this plenitude in his 
actual practice in economics, and also in occasional 
passages in his methodological writ ings,4 can be seen to 
represent one of t he most sustained realizations of the 
Aristotelian idea as outlined by Menger. 
Action, we are told by Mises, involves apprehen-
sion of causal relations and of regularities in the 
phenomena. It presupposes being in a position to 
influence cau$al relations. It presupposes felt uneas-
iness. It involves the exercise of reason. It is a striving 
lo substitute a more satisfactory for a less satisfactory 
state of affairs. 
Acting man transfers the valuation of ends he 
aims at to the means he anticipates utilizing. Action 
tahes time, which like other scarce factors must be 
economized. Action presupposes choosing between 
various opportunities offered for choice. 
. 
Action involves the expectation that purposeful 
behavior has the power to remove or at least alleviate 
uneasiness. Thus it presupposes the uncertainty of 
the future. It involves meanings which the acting 
parties attribute to the situation. A thfog becomes a 
means only when reason plans to employ it for the 
attainment of some end and action really employs it 
for this purpose. 
Certainly some of the concepts involved in the 
above may reasonably be counted as logical concepts; 
others may no less reasonab ly be conceived as being 
in troduced by definWons formulated in terms of 
other, more primitive concepts. Consider, however, 
the co ncepts causation, relative satisfactoriness, rea-
son, uneasiness, valuation, anticipation, means, ends, 
utilization, time, scarcity, opportunity, choice, uncer-
tainty, expectation, etc. The idea that one could simul-
taneous ly and without circularity reduce every one of 
the concepts in this family to the single concept of 
action, that they could all be defined by purely logical 
means in terms of this one single concept, is ~eci­
sively to be rejected. 
IV 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Praxeology and Eco-
nomic Science (1988) is an interes ting defense of a 
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purportedly Kantian reading of Mises which seeks to 
break through the opposition between impositionism 
and reflectionism set out above by acknowledging the 
extent to which "the gulf between the mental and the 
real, outside, physical world is bridged" t hrough ac-
tions. In his treatment of Mises's "axiom of action" 
Hoppe writes: 
This axiom, the proposition that humans act., ful-
fills the requirement precisely for a t rue synthetic 
a priori proposition. It. cannot be denied that t.his 
proposition is true, since t.he denial would have to 
be categorized as an action- and so the truth of the 
statement literally cannot be undone. And the 
axiom is aJso not. derived from observation-there 
are only bodily movements to be observed but no 
such things as actions- but stems instead from 
re flective understa nding. (pp. 19-20) 
There is much in this with which one can concur, though 
it has to be noted that a denial of the axiom of action 
need not in every case be self-refuting: the axiom might, 
for example, be denied by an extra-terrestrial being. 
Moreover there would seem to be many proposit ions 
classicaUy accepted as synthetic and a priori which 
could not be admitted as such on Hoppe's criterion that 
Praxeology is like logic and mathe-
matics in the sense that its con-
tent is a matter of empty 
tautologies . 
their truth "literally cannot be undone" because their 
denial would, in light of the fact that a denial is itself 
an action, be self-refuting. Consider, for example, the 
propositions "nothing can be red and green all over," 
"orange is darker than red," "a promise gives rise to 
mut ually correlated claim and obligation," "given any 
three distinct tones, one lies intermediate between the 
other two." 
The most worrying feature of Hoppe's account is 
indeed that m·any of the most central propositions of 
praxeology itself will fall outside the scope of the 
synthetic a priori as he conceives it. "All the catego-
ries-values, ends, means, choice, preference, cost, 
profit and loss, as well as time and causality-are," 
he tells us, "implied in the axiom of action" (p. 21) But 
how is this "implied" to be understood? As Hoppe 
correctly recognizes, it is not a matter of logical im-
plication. Rather, he seems to argue, it is to be under-
stood as follows: that any denial of a proposition for 
example relating preference to cost must be self-re-
futing. Let us suppose that this is true. Do we know 
that it is true because of what we know about the 
special action of denial, as Hoppe seems to suggest? 
'll(_ota6fe and Quota6[e 
Re: the interaction and collaboration of economists 
and physicists at the Santa Fe lnstitute. "The physical 
scientists were flabbergasted to discover how math-
ematically rigorous theoretical economists are. Phys-
ics is generally considered to be the most 
mathematical of all the sciences, but modem eco-
nomics has it beat. Palmer, a condensed matter phys-
icist, says economists use much more 'fancy 
mathematics' and hard-to-understand notations 
than physicists .... The flip side of the physicists' 
surprise at the rigor of the economists was the 
economists' astonishment at the physicists' lack 
thereof." "Strange Bedfellows,'' Science (August18, 
1989): 700-03. Quoted from the journal of Eco110111ic 
Perspectives (Spring 1990). 
Or do we know that it is true because of what we know 
about preference and cost? Surely at least in part 
because of the latter; but then the appeal to actions 
of denial in the explication of a priori economic knowl-
edge is at best insufficient, and at worst redundant. 
How much better it would be to accept that we are 
dealing here with a family of a priori categories and 
categorical structures which would be synthetic in 
the sense of the (Aristotelian) reflectionist doctrine 
set forth above. 
1Cf. Carl Menger (1871, p. 3; Eng. p. 52, section 1 "On the Essence 
of Goods"). The discussion of such de re necessitation relations in 
Smith (1982). 
2Here the work of the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach is espe-
cially important. For Reinach, who achieved for legal science what 
Menger and his school have achieved in the field of economics, was 
explicitly aware of the non-Kantian nature of his aprioristic views. 
See Reinach (1913), Smith (1982), and chapter 2 of Scheler (1973), 
a work in part inspired by the ontological theory of the a priori 
defended by Reinach . 
The phenomenological innuence is present also in the work of 
Felix Kaufmann, whose relations to Mises and his circle are interest-
ingly discussed in Zillian (1990). 
31 have developed this argument at greater length in "Austrian 
Economics and Austrian Philosophy" (1986). 
4 Consider for example Mises (1981, p. 24). 
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Subjective Value Theory: 
A Reformulation 
by Alex ander Tabarrok 
T he method of Austrian economics stresses the use of words and concepts rather than mathe-
matics, but, unlike mathematics, words and concepts 
change their meaning through time. That f '(x) < 0 
implies a negatively sloping curve was as clear to 
Newton as it is to a modern mathematical economist. 
The meaning Carl Menger ascribed to the term util-
ity, however, differed from that of Mises. Further-
more, the meaning of words in one context can infuse 
and distort the meaning in another context. This is 
why, as Austrian economists, we must occasionally 
"clean house," re-examine our concepts, and clarify 
any that have become distorted. 
This is particularly true in regard to subjective 
value theory. The concept of subjective value is a tool 
used to explain the formation of prices and to clarify 
welfare theory. Unfortunately, it has become dis-
torted because of four errors: (1) the theory has been 
confused with psychological concepts such as happi-
ness; (2) it has been extended to areas where it has 
no relevance such as ethics; (3) there has been a 
To deny that we can recognize 
happiness and misery in our fel-
low human beings is to deny the 
basis of economics. 
